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This article was Si FEDERALPOLICY SINCE 1980 has reflected
adapted from an increasingly confident presumption
remarks presented to that patenting discoveries made in the
the Congressional course of government-sponsored research
Biomedical Research is the most effective way to promote
technology transfer and commercial
Caucus in development of those discoveries in the
Washington, D.C., private sector. Policymakers in the past
June
28,1993. may have thought that the best way to
Reprinted with achieve widespread use of governmentpermission-from sponsored research was to make the
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the J O Uof ~ results freely available to the public; the
NIH Research, new pro-patent policy stresses the need

Val, 5 , No. 10, for exclusive rights as an incentive for
October 1993. industry to invest in bringing new
products to market.
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Although this pro-patent policy may
make a good deal of sense for some
government-sponsored discoveries, there
are reasons to suspect that it makes little
sense for others. In our eagerness to
avoid the inadequacies of the publicdomain approach, we may have moved
too quickly and too emphatically in the
opposite direction, to the point that
patent rights in some governmentsponsored discoveries may actually be
undermining, rather than supporting,
incentives to develop new products and
bring them to market.
It is time to re-evaluate the role of
patents in technology transfer -on the
basis of more than a decade of actual
experience rather than uncorroborated
fears -and consider how the present
sjrstem might be improved.

Laws call for patents
In 1980, Congress passed the
Stevenson-Wydler Innovation Act, which
made technology transfer an integral part
of the research and development responslbili~iesof federal laboratories and their
employees, and the Bayh-Dole Act, which
reversed the prior practice of some
agencies of retaining publlc ownership of
dlscoverles made through federal research funding in universltles and small
businesses Later legislative enactments
and executive orders have broadened the
provisions of Bayh-Dole and StevensonWydler Acts and closed loopholes that
lnigt~thave left potentially valuable
discoveries unpatented
Under the system we have In place
today, whether federally-sponsored
inven~lonsare made in government,
university, or private laboratones, if
anyone involved in the research project
wants the discovery to be patented,
chances are it wlll be patented Thus, for
example, ~f a government agency or
university has no Interest in pursuing
patent rlghts m a discovery, the mdlmdual investigator who made the
d~scoverymay step in and clalm them
Now, all of this makes a good deal of
sense if we want all government-sponsored research dlscovenes to be patented
Sut do we?
One slgn of trouble in paradise for
lederal technology transfer policy is the
reactlon of industry trade groups when
the National Institutes of Health filed
patent applications m 1991 on thousands
of randomly selected partial complementary DNA (cDNA) sequences of unknown
function This sequence lnformat~onwas
discovered In an NIH laboratory as part
of the Human Genome Project, a government-sponsored effort to map and
sequence all of the DNA in the human
chromosomes
Position statements from the Pharmaceutlcal Manufacturers Association
(PMA) and from two biotechnology trade
groups that have slnce merged, the

Industrial Biotechnology Association
(IBA) and the Association of Biotechnology Companies (ABC), contradicted the
hypothesis that government patents on
these cDNA sequences are necessary to
protect the interests of firms that might
develop related products in the future.
PMA and IBA both urged that NIH not
seek patent protection on cDNA sequences of unknown biologcal function.
ABC supported the NIH decision to seek
patent protection, but only as a means of
generating revenues for the government.
Indeed, even ABC urged that the patents
be licensed on a nonexclusive basis so as
not to block development projects in
industry.
These trade groups are not composed
of naive, idealistic scientists who have
limited experience with patents and
limited interest in product development.
Their members are the same hard-nosed,
profit-maximizing firms that Congress is
trylng to entice into developing products
Out of government-sponsored inventions
through its patent policy. Their reactions
to the cDNA patent applications alone are
enough to call into question the strong
pro-patent tilt of the NIH policy.
[Editor's note: In February, the NIH
reversed its policy and withdrew patent
applications for the cDNA partial
sequences. In announcing this decision,

NIH Director Harold Varmus explained
that seeking these patents was not in the
best interest of science or the public.
Varmus said that input from Professor
Elsenberg, who served on a panel
convened to advise him on this issue,
heavily influenced his decision.] It may
be that under current law NIH had little
choice but to pursue patent rights itself
or leave them to the inventor, even
though later product development would
probably be better served by leaving the
DNA sequence information in the public
domain. This suggests at the very least
that federal agencies ought to have more
flexibility to determine that some
inventions would be better left in the
public domain.

Do patents help?
But how can an agency determine
when patent protection is likely to
facilitate technology transfer and product
development and when it is likely to
interfere with those processes? The logic
of the pro-patent stratear itself suggests
certain limitations, The argument for
patenting research discoveries as a means
of promoting their later development into
useful products is this: patents permit the
fimls that invest in product development
to reap the rewards of their investment
through commercially effecdvemonopolies. Patents are most likely to perform
this function when they cover an end
product that is sold to consumers.

PATENTS H A V E A CRITICAL
ROLE T O PLAY IN
PROMOTING TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER. BUT THE
INCENTIVES CREATED BY
PATENT RIGHTS IN
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED
INVENTIONS W O U L D DO
LllTLE T O COMPENSATE FOR
THE DAMAGE W E COULD DO
T O OUR RESEARCH
ENTERPRISE IF W E ALLOCATE
T O O M U C H O F OUR N E W
KNOWLEDGE T O PRIVATE
OWNERS A N D T O O LllTLE
T O THE PUBLIC D O M A I N .
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Somewhat less effective are process
patents covering a specific use of an
unpatented product. The trouble with
these so-called use patents is that as long
as there are other uses for the product
that are not covered by the patent, the
patent holder cannot stop competitors
from selling the unpatented product itself
and thereby driving down its price. If the
product is available from a variety of
sources, it may be impossible to monitor
what purchasers are using it for.
Another even less effective type of
patent covers starting materials or
processes used in making an unpatented
end product. Such patents do not
prevent a competitor from making the
product from different materials or
througha different process, or even from
using the patented materials overseas and
then importing the end product into the
United States. Such a patent may also be
difficult to enforce because of the practical problems involved in detecting and
proving infringement in the manufacturing process.
Weaker still, as a device to keep
competitors out of the market, is a patent
covering products or processes that are
used only during product development.
Not only is it difficult to detect and prove
infringement of such a patent, but often
the only effective remedy will be monetary damages because an injunction
against future use of the invention will
not thwart the efforts of a competitor
who has already finished using it.
For these reasons, firms that are
interested in developing end products for
sale to consumers are unlikely to see
patents on research tools as a very
effective means of protecting their market
exclusivity. Such patents may generate
royalty income, and that prospect may
make it profitable to develop further
research tools in the private sector,
but patents are unlikely to enhance the

incentives of firms to develop end
products through the use of those
research tools.
On the other hand, one firm's research
tool may be another firm's end product.
This is particularly so in the contemporary biotechnology industry, in which
research is big business, and there is
money be made by developing and
marketing research tools for use by other
firms.
Thus, even as the trade groups were
calling on NIH to dedicate its cDNA
sequence information to the public, new
firms were forming to do further cDNA
sequencing in the private sector, presumably with the hope of obtaining their own
patent rights. It may well make sense to
have this particular task performed in the
private sector, and patents may enhance
the incentives of firms to step in and do
it. On the other hand, it may make more
sense to leave this information in the
public domain, even if that means that
the government has to continue to bear
the cost of generating it.

Potential harm to research
There are reasons to be wary of
patents on research tools. Competing
firms may hesitate to request licenses for
fear of revealing the directions of their
own research. Moreover, a large research
project might require access to a great
many research tools; if each of these tools
requires a separate license and royalty
payment, the costs and administrative
burden could mount quickly. Another
danger is that a company might refuse to
make a patented research tool available LO
competitors at any price. Or, patent
holders might find it more lucrative to
license research-tool patents on an

csciusive rather than a nonexclusive
hnsis, thus choking off the research and
clt.\.elopment of other firms.
Basic research activities might also be
~ffecred.For years, this country has
sustained a flourishing biomedical
research enterprise, in which investigators have drawn heavily on discoveries
that their predecessors left in the public
domain. Even if exclusive rights enhance
private incentives to develop further
rcsearch tools, they could do significant
harm to the overall research enterprise by
inh~bitingthe effective use of existing
ones.
Research tools may therefore be one
esample of the sort of discovery for
which esclusive rights do more harm
than good. There are undoubtedly others
as well. Certain fundamental inventions
~ i t ah wide range of applications may be
more effectively exploited if left in the
public domain or otherwise made freely
available to all than if patented and
licensed on an exclusive basis. For
example, the absence of patent protection
on fundamental techniques for producing
hybridomas and monoclonal antibodies
does not seem to have significantly
retarded the development and patenting
of commercial products using those
technologies.

Time to analyze impact
The time is ripe to take a critical look
at the actual operation of our technology-

transfer policy over the past decade and
see how well it is working. This task calls
for more than an examination of aggregate statistics on the percentage of
patented inventions that have been
licensed. It would be useful to know
whether those inventions have led to the
development of commercial products,
and whether those products are protected
by other patents that would provide a
comparable degree of market exclusivity

even if the government-sponsored
invention had been left in the public
domain. I t would be useful to know what
effect those patents have had on the
research and development of the
licensee's competitors, or on other firms
that failed in their bids for exclusive
licenses.
The rhetoric surrounding federal
technology-transfer policy suggests that
whatever is good for industry must be in
the public interest. This is a vast oversimplification of a complex issue. The
private sector responds to the profit
incentives created by whatever policies
the government puts in place. Whenever
the government offers new property
rights, one would expect someone to step
forward to claim them. It doesn't necessarily follow that those property rights
are, on balance, creating new social value
that will make all of us better off.
Patents have a critical role to play in
promoting technology transfer. But the
incentives created by patent rights in
government-sponsored inventions would
do little to compensate for the damage
we could do to our research enterprise if
we allocate too much of our newr knowledge to private owners and too little to
the public domain. Government is
uniquely situated to enrich our public
domain. We should be wary of disabling
the government from performing this
critical function in our eagerness to
enhance private incenthTesto put existing
discoveries to use.
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